Analysis of the draft of Security Strategy of Slovak Republic 2017: Comparison with strategic documents of Czech Republic and Poland.

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Introduction

Security strategy of Slovak Republic (SS SR) is one of the fundamental documents forming the framework for setting and enforcing the security interests and the development of capabilities to ensure the security of Slovak Republic. The current strategy has been in place for 12 years and the time has come to revise it, mainly due to changes in the security environment. The process of adopting a new strategy is lengthy and extremely challenging, which is why we are analysing the draft and drawing attention to possible shortcomings that could be revised and incorporated into the final version of the document.

We have decided to analyse the document by comparing the four distinct areas across similar security documents from Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland. The Czech (SS CR) and Polish (SS PR) security strategies have been chosen because of the similarities in the security environment of all these countries. These states are all on the eastern wing of NATO, they were not seriously affected by the migration crisis and they form a specific security complex, meaning their security interests are intertwined. As a part of the analysis, we compare the formal aspects (content, methodology, starting points), security interests, security environment (focus on specific factors) and security policies. We chose these areas based on their importance in relation to the development of the new document as well as due to the possibility of comparing similar aspects across the security documents of different countries. The purpose of this analysis is to provide policy-makers with a broader overview of the status of similar documents abroad and to highlight any shortcomings that a forthcoming document may contain.

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1. Content comparison

According to the draft of SS SR 2017[2], the document follows and replaces the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic adopted in 2005. Structure of the new document is identical to the document from 2005, except for the "Background" chapter, which substitutes the introduction. The structure is also similar to the document "Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2015"[3]. More complex but at the same time the most "structured and hierarchized" is the "National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2012"[4]. It analyses the security environment from global to European (regional) and national level. Compared to the strategies of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, the document analyses Poland as a security entity and evaluates the place of Poland in Europe and in the world. One can say that this is a strategy with an ambition to become a regional power.

1.1 Comparison of the methodology

All three strategies have a similar methodical approach:

- Definition of security interests.

- Analysis of the security environment.

- Promotion of security interests.[5]

The following table shows a comparison of the structure of strategic documents by country.

SS SR	SS CR	SS PR
I. **Background**	I. **Background**	I. **Poland as a security entity** o Poland in Europe and in the world o National interests and strategic goals o Strategic capabilities of national security
II. **Security interests**	III. **Security interests**	*Included above*
II. **Security environment**	III. Security environment o Context o Trends	II. Security environment o Global dimension o Regional dimension

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[2] Version from 22nd of May 2017.

[3] https://www.vlada.cz/assets/ppov/brs/dokumenty/bezpecnostni-strategie-2015.pdf.

[4] https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/SBN%20RP.pdf.

[5] In the case of the SS SR, this is security policy, in the case of the Czech Republic, strategy for the promotion of security interests and, in the case of SS PR, the concept of strategic security actions.

	o Threats	o National dimension
III. Security policy o Determination o Resilience o Defence	**IV. Strategy for enforcing security interests**	**III. Concept of strategic actions, operational strategy** o Defence actions o Protective actions o Social actions in the B area o Economic actions in the B area
		IV. Concept of strategic preparation o Subsystem of management of national security o Subsystem of defence o Subsystem of protection o Social subsystems o Economic subsystems

1.2 Comparison of "background"

In the "background" chapter (SS PR and SS CR in their introduction), all documents characterize their security strategy as a fundamental document of security policy, which is based on the constitution and other legal framework, including membership in the NATO, the EU and other organizations.

The Slovak Republic's security strategy has the background set relatively briefly. The characteristics of a state, in accordance with international law, respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, does not have territorial requirements, does not threaten anyone militarily, but is aware of the existence of threats of non-military and military nature. The goal is to safeguard the security of the citizens and the state. The strategy is based on the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and on the obligations arising from membership in the EU, NATO, UN and other international organizations. It identifies security interests, characterizes the security environment and defines security policies.

The security strategy of the Czech Republic in the "background" chapter points to the role of the government and other bodies of the self-governing regions in the field of security. It presupposes the active cooperation of citizens, legal and natural persons and public administration bodies, which results in the society's "resilience" to

security threats. The SS SR includes "resilience" as the second pillar of the security policy. Compared to the Slovak Republic, the Czech Security Strategy underlines the political and economic stability of the EU as a key to ensuring security (Article 8), the indivisibility of security of the Czech Republic, the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, global security (Article 9) and active participation in the collective defence of NATO with strong Trans-Atlantic ties (Article 11).

In the Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, the "background" (understood from the point of view of security strategies of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic) is in subchapter 1.1 "Poland in Europe and in the World". It is broken down according to importance of its parts for Poland's security in terms of its position. It begins with the characteristics of Poland, the importance of strengthening security capacities and active participation in international cooperation (Chapter I, 1.1. / 5). The document highlights the importance of Euro-Atlantic and European integration for the strengthening of Poland's security. NATO is considered to be the most important form of political and military cooperation, the European Union is strengthening the socio-economic development and the position of Poland in the world and the USA is the most important non-European partner (Chapter I, 1.1. / 6). It also stresses the importance of regional cooperation, where Poland has strong ambitions. It also mentions cooperation of the Weimar Triangle, V4, plus new areas of cooperation with the Baltic countries and Romania (Chapter I, 1.1. / 6). Regarding Poland's neighbourhood, the background specifically addresses the Russian Federation (Chapter I, 1.1. / 6). It underlines NATO – Russia and EU – Russia relations, while respecting international law and sovereignty and integrity of all states.[6] At the end, the attitude towards the United Nations, the OSCE, and global issues is mentioned.

1.3 Partial conclusion

This orientation in the "background" part of the security strategies of Poland and the Czech Republic gives a basic orientation for the whole document. It might be worth considering structuring the "bases of security policy" similarly in the SS SR, although these aspects are later included in the parts discussing security environment and security policy.

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[6] This background is used in the chapter devoted to security environment, where authors critically evaluate the restoration of the position of Russian Federation at the expense of its neighbors as well as its confrontational foreign policy (Ukraine).

2. Comparison of security interests

The theoretical area discusses how to characterize security interests, including their "hierarchy". In Czech Republic, the security interests are hierarchically organized as "vital", "strategic" and "other significant". The Slovak Republic had a similar breakdown in the SS SR 2001. Such procedure was abandoned in the preparation of the SS SR 2005. One reason was the interlocking and mutual combination of security threats. The Czech Republic's security strategy has left a hierarchy of interests; however, in the "background" (Article 6), it is noted that given the nature of the current security challenges, security policy cannot be strictly divided according to partial security interests and that institutional and material interconnection of instruments is necessary.

Due to the continuity of the draft of SS SR 2017 and SS SR 2005, there was no significant shift in the identification of security interests. They remained almost identical in terms of both text and order: preservation of state existence, sovereignty and integrity; development of the democratic establishment and the rule of law; and sustainable development of security. Compared to the SS SR 2005, the recent version added quality of the environment, cultural development and a safe cyberspace.

The security, stability and capability of the EU and NATO as a security interest have remained (stress was added on staying in the "integration core" - responding to changes in the EU). The Trans-Atlantic Partnership was on the fifth place in the SS SR 2005, in the 2017 document it is penultimate, included in the area of extending security and stability in the European neighbourhood.

If we understand the hierarchy of security interests by considering the order of interests involved, the preservation of states' existence, sovereignty and territorial integrity is at the top of the pyramid in the strategic thinking of all three states. In the SS CR, it is classified as a vital interest; in the SS SR, it is at the first place; SS PR has not explicitly included it because this national interest is directly in Article 5 of the Constitution. Therefore, at the top level of the security interests pyramid is the need to achieve effective national security capabilities to prevent threats, including deterrence, defence and protection. The strategic documents of Poland and the Czech Republic place more emphasis on stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, the coherence and effectiveness of NATO and the EU and their strategic partnership and complementary development of defence and security capabilities[7] - in the SS CR they are included in the interests; SS PR lists them in the security objectives.

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[7] In SS CR Article 14, paragraphs 4 a 5. SS PR has interlocked security interests and security goals. On the top of security interests is the achievement of effective security capability to face threats and secure strong position of Poland in international security system (Article 11 SS PR). Among security goals, the first one is the

2.1 Partial conclusion

The strategic interests of all three countries are in line with previous strategies in relation to the response to the development of the strategic environment. All are interested in preserving states' existence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; which are at the top of the figurative pyramid in strategic consideration. The SS CR and SS PR respect the security hierarchy from the global level (UN), through the Euro-Atlantic area (with focus on NATO and EU partnership), to national level. Security interests of the Slovak Republic move from the problems of internal security and factors connected with it towards external factors. The external factors appear to be less organized – they move from the security and stability of the NATO and the EU (where the main interest is remaining in the EU integration core) through effective EU and the promotion of global security policies, to security and stability in the European neighbourhood (where the Trans-Atlantic partnership is included). SS SR does not order security interests according to the theoretical approach to vital, important and other; but in our opinion this kind of alignment of security interests would contribute to a higher clarity of the document regarding clarification of priorities.

3. Comparison of security environment

All three strategic documents respond to major changes in the security environment. Compared with the SS SR, the two other strategic documents are more structured in their evaluation of the security environment and, as in the preceding chapters, more hierarchical and stratified. SS CR is based on strategic context, which is adjoined by an analysis of trends in the security environment, from which the specific security threats are extracted[8]. SS PR has a security environment stratified from global through regional to national dimensions[9]. Based on this the characteristics of the security organizations in the individual dimensions are analysed, along with their possible development, problems and their influence on the security of Poland.

The draft of the SS SR describes the external security environment in the first six articles (8-13). It ranges from the rising ambition of some states to the use of military force (Article 19), through collapsed states (Article 20) and the growth of the

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development and improvement of integrated national security system; second is the development of defence and protective capabilities and their interoperability with NATO and EU; third is strengthening of readiness of NATO for collective defense and the last is the coherence with actions of EU and the strong position of Poland within both organizations (Article 12 SS PR).

[8] In the draft of SS SR 2017 there are no exactly identified security threats.

[9] In the draft of SS SR 2017, the global, regional and internal factors are in disorder, mixed with other phenomenon and the order of external and internal factors of security environment is also not identified.

severity of non-military threats to the negative aspects of globalization and to the change of power of individual actors in the world. Other articles are characterized by overflow of internal and external factors. For example, after a critical analysis of the security system of the Slovak Republic (Articles 14 and 15), there is a certain "mix" of factors – from the development of democratic state establishment, through internal social factors, to hybrid activities, cyber security, extremism and organized crime. Analysis and trends in international security organizations (UN, OSCE, NATO, EU) are included in the conclusion of the chapter on the security environment.

3.1 Comparison of specific factors of security environment

All the strategic documents agree in their assessment that the security environment has deteriorated considerably and is characterized by unpredictability and interdependence of factors. Each strategic document considers the promotion of foreign-policy interests by some states as a threat, especially when using military force. In this context, the possibility of direct military threat to individual states (SR, CR, PR) is also analysed. We can also see the regression of the severity of various other security threats. For example, the threat of terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction has moved below the threat posed by aggressive regimes; promotion of interests through use of force; and instability and conflicts in the European neighbourhood. Greater emphasis is put on hybrid activities, cyber security, terrorism, extremism and the migration crisis. In addition, each strategy considered the threat of penetration of borders by foreign fighters.

3.2 The most serious factors of external environment

The draft of SS SR 2017 has less structured security environment compared to SS SR 2005 (which seems to be the problem of the entire document)[10]. As mentioned above, the external environment is examined in the first six articles of Chapter III Security Environment.

3.2.1 The attempts for revision of international order, probability of using military force, hybrid activities (reaction to the policy of Russian Federation)

These factors are in the draft of the SS SR in the Articles 9, 11, 12, 13, 18. The document claims that the security environment has deteriorated significantly (Article 9) and the use of armed force is still a factor of international relations. In addition to

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[10] Previous version moves hierarchically from UN, through NATO, EU and other organizations. It also shows tendencies of the development of security environment toward hierarchization of threats (terrorism, WMD, failed states, regional conflicts, Organized crime, migration and others, Articles 16 – 33). Independent threats are not included in the draft of SS SR 2017.

the increased potential of conventional weapons used by state and non-state actors, efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction persist (Article 12). The threat of armed aggression cannot be ruled out regarding the deteriorating stability and the escalation of conflicts in the regions neighbouring NATO and EU territory (Article 13). Article 9 states that the following are the main manifestations of deteriorated security environment:

- Promotion of foreign-political interests by some states and their use of military force to disrupt the territorial integrity of other.

- Increase in the occurrence of terrorist attacks.

- Violation of international law.

- Increase in the number of failed states in the EU's neighbouring regions.

The first and third point are related to the policy of the Russian Federation, although it is not explicitly mentioned. A similar approach, although more addressing, is also apparent in the SS CR. This is obviously because explicit mentioning of the Russian Federation could affect diplomatic relations and that such strategy should be of a general nature. In this context, Article 18 of the draft of the SS SR can be cited. It points to the negative impact of hybrid activities that both state and non-state actors can use to achieve specific goals without a formal declaration of war.

The Czech Security Strategy is more specific when describing trends (Article 19). In addition to the ambition to use military force, it also points to the growth of military capabilities, including cybercrime, weapons of mass destruction, but also the use of raw material demand and activities on the financial markets. The threat of building the sphere of influence through a combination of political, economic and military pressure is mentioned. Among other threats are the weakening the mechanism of cooperative security; the efforts to revise the existing international order; and the will to use hybrid methods to achieve political goals.

The Polish Security Strategy is the most specific of the three documents. In the "Regional dimension" section of the security environment, there are four factors determining security in Europe: NATO, EU, the strategic presence of the US on the European continent and relations with Russia (Article 34). In the foreseeable future, multiple military threats persist in Europe. There are also sources of destabilization that may result in a military conflict (Article 35). In the neighbourhood of Poland there is a risk of regional and local conflicts that may directly or indirectly involve Poland. There is a great concentration of military potential and both non-military and military threats to Poland. Military conflicts can range from military activities below

the level of conventional war to less likely large-scale conflicts (Article 36). Article 41 assesses Russia's position as follows: "*Russia's relations with the West will remain an important factor influencing the security of Poland, the region and Europe. The attempt to restore Russia's status as a major power at the expense of its neighbourhood, as well as the escalation of its confrontational policy, exemplified by the conflict with Ukraine, including the accession of the Crimea, has a negative impact on security in the region.*" [11]

3.2.2 Globalization, increase in the influence of non-state actors, terrorism, phenomenon of foreign fighters

Compared to the strategic documents of the Czech Republic and Poland and to the previous SS SR 2005, the Slovak draft does not provide a more comprehensive analysis of globalization[12].

SS CR (Article 22) and SS PR (Article 25) draw attention to the negative aspects of globalization (unpredictability, not being limited by geographical boundaries or political systems, undermining the system of international control, easier spread of radical political and religious ideas).

None of the strategic documents specifically mentions the so called Islamic state, but they all analyse the increase in the importance and influence of non-state actors, their ability to threaten the interests of states and the realization of their territorial ambitions. In the draft of SS SR, non-state actors do not figure as a separate item in the assessment of the security environment[13]. In relation to non-state actors, a new phenomenon in the strategic documents of all countries is the risk of foreign terrorist fighters. In the draft of the SS SR, it is mentioned as a special point in Article 24[14].

The re-evaluation was also made regarding the assessment of the risk of terrorism. While in the SS SR 2005 European countries were considered potential

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[11] Regarding the analysis of threats and the attention paid to Russia, the fundamental shift occurred in the document "Koncepcia obrany PR 2017". "*Koncepcja Obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*" (www.mon.gov.pl/d/pliki/rozne/.../KORP_DRUK_v03_mn2.pdf)

It reevaluates the basic premises regarding the perception of threats. The scale moves from Russian aggression in Ukraine, through destabilization in the Middle East and in northern Africa, to terrorist attacks. Russian aggression occupies the position of first-order threat.

[12] In SS SR, it was included as one of the tendencies affecting the security environment. Threats were ordered as follows: terrorism, WMD, failed states, regional conflicts, illegal migration. Then there was globalization characterized as a challenge (Article. 26): Globalization brings events and processes, which are beyond the control of the state and it blurs the differences between internal and external security and the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy.

[13] SS SR 2005 (Article 14) mentioned the negative impact of non-state actors. SS CR (Article 26) identifies the increase in their capabilities to replace the elements of state system, implement territorial ambitions and threaten stability and integrity of targeted states.

[14] In SS CR, as a part of Article 24 about non-state actors and as part of threat posed by terrorism.

targets of terrorism, the draft SS SR (Article 23) claims an increase in crimes of terrorism in Europe, where it is stated that the risk of terrorist activities in Slovakia has increased. The SS PR (Article 30) mentions international terrorism and organized crime as components of instability, along with uncontrolled migration, which is identified as a challenge.

Illegal migration, a tension-inducing phenomenon between the V4 countries and some Western European countries, is not identified as a top threat in any of the strategic documents. In the draft of the SS SR it is included separately in the Article 26. It speaks about the migration crisis facing the EU and highlights the importance of protection of the Schengen Borders. It does not exclude further intensification of mass illegal migration and its implications for the security of the Slovak Republic. At the same time, increased risk of the arrival of persons sympathetic to extremism, radical movements and terrorism is mentioned. The SS CR has the negative aspects of migration on the sixth place in the threat hierarchy. It also sees increased rates of illegal migration as a source of security problems[15].

3.2.3 Security environment in Europe and its neighbourhood, influence of the most important security organizations, NATO and the EU

All three strategic documents agree in their assessment that the security situation in European neighbourhood is deteriorating, some of them not excluding either the direct threat to some NATO and EU members. At the same time, they point to the risk of decreasing cohesion within NATO and the EU, but they emphasize the role of both organizations as well as the importance of cooperation between them

In the draft of the SS SR, Article 10 assesses the negative impact of developments in eastern neighbourhood, the security situation in the Western Balkans, the Middle East and Central and North Africa. The security strategies of both Czech Republic and Poland emphasize the risks in the eastern neighbourhood more and do not exclude direct threat to some of the NATO and EU member states in this respect[16]. The strategic documents of Poland and the Czech Republic assess the situation to the east more negatively compared to the draft of the Slovak Republic.

NATO membership is considered as a key factor in the defence of the Slovak Republic (Article 32 draft of SS SR)[17]. It highlights NATO's strategic importance for security and stability in Europe, reaffirming its ability to respond to changes in the

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[15] In the part discussing the measures (Article 68), it alone mentions that in the area of immigration, Czech Republic maintains great amount of sovereignty.

[16] SS CR Article 17, plus the part dealing with threats. SS PR Article 35. Article 36 does not exclude the risk of regional and local conflicts, which can directly or indirectly affect Poland. It also includes military conflicts on scale lesser then conventional war up to the large-scale conflict, which is less probable.

[17] It is at least paradoxical that in the list of security actors, NATO is analyzed behind OSN, OSCE and EU.

security environment (including the strengthening of the alliance's eastern wing). It does not exclude the reduction of the alliance's cohesion and capacity to act as a result of the uneven sharing of defence and security burdens between member states. The Czech Republic's security strategy (Article 23) does not exclude changes in the relative power of individual actors due to economic development. It claims that the tendency of states to prioritize their national interests over common interest can lead to reduction in the solidarity and efficiency of NATO and the EU. It also points to the long-term low level of defence budgets. Similar conclusions (NATO as the most important partner, the need to maintain a full range of military and political capabilities, the negative impact of the decline in military budgets) are also mentioned in SS PR, Articles 37 and 39.

Regarding EU's position in the security environment, the SS SR draft (Article 31) claims that EU membership brings stability and economic growth to Slovakia. It also mentions that European integration process is in the stage where it is necessary to maintain public confidence in the EU. Decline of confidence in EU member countries has a negative impact on their security[18].

Compared to the strategic documents of the Czech Republic and Poland, there is a lack of focus towards the EU Common Security and Defence Policy and the EU Internal Security Strategy in the draft of SS SR[19].

3.3 Partial conclusions

The SS SR 2017 draft has a less structured security environment compared to the SS SR 2005 and other foreign documents. In SS SR 2005, it went hierarchically from the UN, through NATO, the EU and other organizations and showed the trends in the development of the security environment, thereby hierarchizing threats. Compared to the strategic documents of the Czech Republic and Poland; and compared to the SS SR 2005, the draft of the SS SR 2017 does not provide a more comprehensive analysis of globalization. When analysing changes in the security environment, the draft of the SS SR only generally assesses the situation in the eastern neighbourhood of NATO and the EU. In view of the high risk posed by this situation, this phenomenon is not adequately categorized alongside the situation in the Western Balkans, Middle East or North Africa. All areas have their specifics, it would be more

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[18] It lists finding answers to key questions as well as the lack of capabilities to implement autonomous actions of the EU as problematic.

[19] SS CR, Article 33: "EU Common Security and Defense Policy is supposed to be strong element for external actions of EU." SS PR, Article 38 also emphasizes the factor of EU Common Security and Defense Policy for the security of Poland. At the same time, it emphasizes more intense cooperation between EU and NATO and political will to develop defense capabilities. In Article 43, it understands the processes in the eastern neighborhood of EU as challenge.

appropriate to analyse them separately and more specifically. Not all the threats are equal, whether in their capacity or their will to cause damage.

4. Comparison of security policies, strategies for enforcing security interests

Compared with the SS SR 2005, as well as with the strategic documents of the Czech Republic and Poland, the fourth part is more difficult to compare because of "inconsistency". The security policy in SS SR 2005 is divided into principles, security system, security policy instruments and security of the citizen and the state. It states the attitude towards NATO, the EU and its CFSP and continues with the security of the citizen and the state and the stability of the security environment.

SS CR, in Chapter V, claims that the strategy for the promotion of security interests consists of:

- The collective dimension of security (where policy is related to the most important security organizations - NATO, EU, OSCE, UN).
- The prevention strategy (where foreign policy priorities with an emphasis on European space are concerned).
- Ensuring security (economic, institutional).
- Security system.

As stated in the introduction, SS PR has two concepts in response to the changes in security environment:

- The concept of strategic actions (Chapter III)
- The concept of strategic training (Chapter IV)

Both are similar in structure (Defence actions - Protective actions - Social security actions - Economic actions in area B), and in the division of the security subsystems (National Security Management subsystem - subsystem of Defence - subsystem of Protection - Social subsystems - Economic subsystems).

The draft of SS SR 2017 includes in Chapter IV "Security Policy", a security policy and a security system (Articles 34 and 35). The security policy stands on three pillars:

- Determination – systematic improvement of the security system and active participation in shaping the policies and strategies of international organizations and their implementation, especially in the EU and NATO environment.

- Resilience – the ability of the state administration and local authorities to maintain or quickly restore their core functions even in the case of serious security incidents and crises.
- Defence – the ability of all executive components of the SR security system to effectively defend the SR.

These pillars determine the requirements of the security system rather than the requirements for formulation of the security policy[20]. This approach has influenced the formulation of the security policy of the Slovak Republic. It can be said that to maintain these pillars, a certain "structuring" of security policy has disappeared, both in terms of the importance of security interests and in terms of responding to threats. Therefore, the comparison of the elements of the security policy is based on the selected phenomena of the security environment from the previous chapter.

4.1 Attempts for revision of international order, probability of using military force, hybrid activities.

There are no specific responses to these security environment factors in Slovakia's draft of strategy. As a more general response, it is possible to use Article 48, which refers to the enforcement of international law and the objective of achieving effective multilateralism in matters of international security. Other articles are devoted to preventive diplomacy (Article 50) and the commitment to maintain development assistance funding (Article 55). Article 46 claims that Slovakia accepts the concept of resilience to hybrid threats.

From the perspective of the reaction to the likelihood of using military force as well as responding to the changes in the security environment, the most specific part of the draft is "defence". It is also the most structured part of the security policy. In Articles 90-96, it presumes the adaptation of defence to the changing security environment, highlighting state's primary responsibility for its own defence, and putting its security in terms of broader context of the NATO and the EU. Armed forces are understood as the decisive executive element of the state defence system[21].

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[20] In the "determination" section, the first notions are devoted to increasing the efficiency of security system (Article 40), its adaptation (Article 41), education of population on the topic of security (Article 42) and analytical tools of early warning system (Article 43). Similarly, in the "resilience" section the first notions are devoted to the handling of crisis situation (Article 58), systems of crisis planning (Article 59), training of crisis management (Article 60) and protection of civilians (Articles 62-63).

[21] It is the only notion about subsystem of security system in the document under evaluation. This approach would also improve the formulation of security policy in other subsystems (internal security-protective subsystem, subsystem of economic security, social subsystem and others). This kind of typology is present in SS PR.

In the SS CR, Article 50 claims that the Czech Republic will use bilateral relations, and instruments of the alliance and the EU (and of UN and OSCE) to mitigate threats (weakening of cooperative security, instability and regional conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic area and the surrounding areas). In other articles, approach to these tools is discussed in more detail.

The most specific and at the same time the most assertive is the Polish security strategy. The first priority of strategic actions (Article 65) emphasizes "*Ensuring preparedness and demonstration of resolve to act in the field of security and defence*", including an effective response to political or military extortion. It focuses on defensive actions to address the threats to independence and territorial integrity and specifies actions in the military sphere[22].

4.2 Policies toward global actors, NATO, EU

Under the section "Determination", after mentioning the steps to develop the security system (see note 18), the position towards the EU, NATO, UN and OSCE is stated. From the perspective of global context, it mentions the enforcement of international law to achieve effective multilateralism in matters of international security and enhancing confidence (Article 48). Regarding the position towards the EU, participation in the enhanced cooperation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU is mentioned, in line with the EU's Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy and its contractual framework. In this context, the Slovak Republic will focus on deepening the EU cooperation in the sphere of internal security (Article 49).

Regarding the relationship between the EU and NATO, it emphasizes the development of strategic cooperation and support of coordinated approach to solve questions of common concern. When strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy, Slovakia will see NATO as an immediate partner with unique military structures and capabilities (Article 51). Article 53 mentions the commitment to strengthen collective defence within NATO. It also claims that Slovakia will achieve and maintain its defence expenditure in accordance with accepted international commitments[23].

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[22] Article 70. The fundamental principle of defense actions is continual readiness to react against the threat aimed at independence and integrity of the state. Additionally, it also includes participation on international effort devoted to the reduction of the sources of threats, including international security operations (Article 73). Actions in military sphere are focused on maintaining complex readiness of the state to effectively react to military threats. Armed forces are the primary actor to deal with the tasks in this sphere (Article 73).

[23] The height of defence expenditure is identified in the "defence" section, where the goal is to achieve 2 % GDP by the year 2020 (Article 95).

Regarding "global actors", Article 57 claims that:
- Special emphasis will be placed on strengthening the trans-Atlantic link and the European partnership.
- The relationship with the US remains the key as well relationship as with other allies and partners sharing the same democratic values and principles.
- The Russian Federation has a major impact on European security. Slovakia will pursue pragmatic and mutually beneficial Slovak-Russian relations, with an emphasis on economic and cultural cooperation[24].

SS CR devotes a special section to "collective dimension of security and defence" (Articles 35-49). There is a comprehensive reflection on the direction of security policy of the Czech Republic regarding NATO and the EU. Compared to the Slovak draft, it emphasizes strengthening of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, involvement in the NATO programs and policies and strengthening of the alliance infrastructure (including the reception of allied forces in the Czech Republic). There is also a clearer position towards the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes engaging in the building of EU permanent military capabilities, including battle groups.

The Polish Security Strategy sets three priorities for security policy:
- Security of its own citizens and territory, support for the defence of the allies and strengthening the position of Poland in international relations (Article 66).
- Consolidation of defence functions of NATO, including strengthening the eastern wing and strengthening NATO-EU strategic cooperation. It is the only strategy which supports the wider US military presence in Europe, including in Poland (Article 67). The relationship with Russia is understood in the context of NATO[25].
- Support and selective participation in international community actions. The article identifies the attitude towards the UN and the OSCE.

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[24] In comparison to SS CR and SS PR, which are both very critical towards Russia, SS SR draft mentions the possibility of cooperation.

[25] We can expect the problem of consistency of any measures with international law. The central point of the background is the analysis of security interests of the Alliance and utilization of principles of pragmatism and reciprocity.

4.3 Globalisation, increased influence of non-state actors, terrorism, phenomenon of foreign fighters

In the draft of the security strategy, there is no specific policy response to globalization and the increased influence of non-state actors. Certain general tasks are mentioned in the Article 48 on international law and effective multilateralism and in Article 50 on preventive diplomacy. The "resilience" section highlights the factors of extremism, terrorism, migration, energy security and cyber security.

In Article 66, the fight against terrorism is defined as one of the main priorities of the Security Policy and within it:

- The SR will minimize the security threat associated with foreign terrorist fighters and their return to their home states or other countries.
- It will implement measures to prevent the entry of persons representing a terrorist threat or radicalized persons into their territory. In addition to implementing repressive measures, attention will be paid to prevent and minimalize the impact of propaganda of jihadist groups
- Part of it is combating the financing of terrorist activities and engaging in post-conflict reconstruction of war-torn countries, including humanitarian and development aid.

The phenomenon of migration is discussed in Articles 70 and 71. These emphasize the management of migration in the wider EU context and in the context of promoting a sustainable migration and asylum policy, the concept of effective solidarity and the process of implementing the compact in the European Migration Agenda. It also includes strict application of the Schengen rules and prioritization of the return policy and the elimination of the absence of controls at the internal borders of the Schengen area.

In comparison with the draft, SS CR understands the issues of fighting terrorism more in the framework of NATO and EU cooperation (Articles 57, 58) and with the anti-terrorist strategy of EU (Article 56). On the topic of migration, it does not differ very much from the Slovak draft and the similar approach can also be found in SS PR.

4.4 Partial conclusions

Compared to the SS SR 2005, as well as with the Czech and Polish strategic documents, the fourth part of the draft of SS SR 2017 is quite diversified. It lacks a certain prioritization of policies in response to analysed factors of security environment. As for the "new phenomena", it is more cautious compared to the SS CR and SS PR in response to the situation on the NATO and EU eastern wing, which

is also reflected in the formulation of policy towards the Russian Federation. The "three pillars" approach has influenced formulation of the security policy of the Slovak Republic. It can be said that in order to maintain these pillars, a certain "structuring" of security policy has disappeared, both in terms of the importance of security interests and in terms of responding to the threats. From the perspective of the reaction to the likelihood of using military force as well as responding to the changes in the security environment, the most specific part of the draft is "defence". It is also the most structured part of the security policy.

Conclusion

New Security Strategy is inevitable because of the outdated nature of the current document. As part of our analysis, we came up with several findings that could help to improve the draft once they are incorporated.

I.   It would be worth considering adjusting the part devoted to the background, as is the case with similar documents from Poland and Czech Republic. This could improve the orientation throughout the document and make it more transparent.

II.   The strategy would benefit from a hierarchy of interests and threats that would lead to clear prioritization in these areas. The absence of priorities is also present with regard to policies, which are to respond to changes in the security environment. The basis for any strategy should be to prioritize both objectives and measures. Means at our disposal are and will always be limited, and it is therefore essential to have a clear idea of which interests are the most important and which can be waived. Prioritization is extremely important because situations may arise when the individual interests are incompatible and we will have to decide for following one and sacrificing the others. Same logic applies to threats. Not all threats are equal, whether in their capacity or their will to cause damage.

III. The document suffers from a lack of structure. This is particularly evident in the parts devoted to the security environment, but it is visible across the whole strategy. The structure of SS PR could serve as an inspiration to remove this shortcoming.

IV.   Compared to the strategic documents of the Czech Republic and Poland, there is a lack of a position on the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU and on the EU's internal security strategy. This position should be added to make the role of Slovakia understandable for all relevant actors.

After incorporating these recommendations, the final version of the document should meet the purpose it is intended to serve and thus create an effective framework for setting up and enforcing security interests and developing capabilities to ensure the security of Slovak Republic.